Improvisation as Military Doctrine: Iran and the Rise of America’s New Way of War
In this geopolitical analysis, Aiden Bijloo explains how the American intervention in the war in Iran differs from previous U.S. involvement in Iraq or Afghanistan.
On Saturday, 28 February, my cousin called from Iran. “There are explosions in the city,” he said. “We are fine for now, but the connection probably won’t hold for long.” In the days that followed, we managed only brief fragments of contact. An almost complete internet blackout, which is still in effect, has made contact sporadic and uncertain
That uncertainty is political as much as it is personal. Much has been said about the war by governments, analysts, and exiled opposition figures. Yet even after weeks of bombardment, one thing remains strikingly unclear: What is this war meant to achieve? The US government has not been able to give any clear answers or offer concrete objectives.
The war has been framed, at different moments, as a response to Iran’s nuclear programme, as a way to install regime change in Iran, or as a way to diminish Iran’s military power. Meanwhile, astonishment and discontent is growing, even with staunch supporters of Donald Trump, with the effects of the war being felt worldwide. Members of the US Senate, both Democrat and Republican, have started being more vocal about the complete lack of clarity about this war, which is by some within the inner circles of Trump referred to as a a special military operation, rather than a war. Language that carries an uncomfortable resemblance to Vladimir Putin’s description of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The ambiguity of military strategy matters because it may not be accidental or simply a sign of incompetence. One could interpret this war as a product of Trump’s personality: impulsive, contradictory and theatrical. But this explanation falls short. What is emerging is not the abandonment of military strategy and doctrine but the emerging of a new US military doctrine. Where chaos plays a key role, where military objectives are purposefully held ambiguous, and legal justifications are blurred. Improvisation is no longer what happens when strategy fails, it is the strategy itself.
To understand this shift in military logic, we must first understand the dominant US military doctrine that shaped American military thinking for the past 30 years. The Powell doctrine is named after US General and Secretary of State Colin Powell and was shaped by him in the run-up to the 1990-1991 Gulf War. This military doctrine has been widely embraced by US policy makers, presidents, and military leadership. The Powell doctrine held that military force should only be used as a last resort, after all diplomatic and other non-violent means have been employed.
If after careful consideration war is still deemed necessary, it should have clear and realistic objectives with a strong exit strategy, and with clear public support. Moreover, when starting a war one must employ overwhelming force to defeat the enemy. This military doctrine was developed in response to US failures in the Vietnam war and meant to avoid costly forever wars with high death tolls, financial losses and losing popular support from the US people.
“What the Powell doctrine offered, however, was a clear standard along which American wars could be judged: had diplomacy been exhausted, were the objectives clear, and was there an end goal?”
Much can be said about the Powell doctrine and its effectiveness. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan showed that even following this doctrine the US still ended up fighting long, costly, and according to more critical voices, unjustified wars. Leading to many civilian deaths, leaving Iraq in chaos and the Taliban still in power in Afghanistan. What the Powell doctrine offered, however, was a clear standard along which American wars could be judged: had diplomacy been exhausted, were the objectives clear, and was there an end goal? Under Trump, this standard has been replaced by what seems to be improvisation. Force comes first, the plan follows later.
The abduction of Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro in January was one of the first clear signs of this shift. The bombing of boats in Venezuelan waters was first presented as an anti-drug trafficking operation, which escalated into a wider “law enforcement mission” closely tied to drug and terrorism charges, leading eventually to the abduction of Maduro. Interestingly, right after the abduction Trump propagated a new objective, citing the removal of the regime in Venezuela as one of the main reasons for the US military action in the region.
When this proved more difficult than expected, Trump changed his mind again and declared the military operation a major success as Maduro had been removed and the country had opened up to US oil investments. Besides this military action being illegal under international law, it should also be noted Congress had not been notified beforehand, and no address to the American people had been held beforehand or any other attempt to gain popular support. Contrasting to previous US military operations, where the president would hold a televised address to the nation and where Congress had a final say.
“By restricting access to the Strait of Hormuz, Iran has been able to place enormous pressure on the whole world, as oil and gas prices continued to rise, something Trump had been warned against.”
The current war in Iran shows the Trump doctrine more clearly and on a far larger scale. While the war is hopefully coming to an end, with negotiations and diplomatic talks ongoing, US lawmakers are still demanding basic information and clarity about the military campaign. American intelligence has reportedly acknowledged that the Iranian regime retains control over the country, while its military remains strong enough to retaliate. Some experts have even argued that the regime has only been strengthened, further entrenching its control over the country and displaying how much influence they can have on not only the region but the world economy.
By restricting access to the Strait of Hormuz, Iran has been able to place enormous pressure on the whole world, as oil and gas prices continued to rise, something Trump had been warned against. In other words, the Trump administration has caused, together with Israel, a major regional war without being able (or willing) to define a stable political endpoint in public. It seems that framing your military actions through the lens of the Trump doctrine only offers downsides, however there is one clear advantage to this approach: if the objectives are fluid, they can be revised in real time, making failure harder to measure because success is constantly redefined.
This is exactly the key of the Trump doctrine. Under this military doctrine, victory becomes something elastic. It can mean degrading Iran’s military capabilities, encouraging regime change, destroying nuclear facilities, or simply killing its leadership. If war aims change so easily, failure is hard to measure and Trump can walk away anytime declaring a victory. Even now, as diplomatic talks continue and the Strait of Hormuz has reportedly reopened, Trump could end US involvement tomorrow and declare victory.
After weeks of regional chaos, economic pressure, and damage to international law, he could point to the killing of much of Iran’s leadership as evidence that the operation succeeded. Yet this was never clearly formulated as a war aim. That may not matter politically. The ambiguity allows Trump to reshape the purpose of the war after the fact, walk away as the victor, and sell the outcome to his electorate as proof of strength.
This is why it is so important to realise the changing nature of how the US fights its wars. The difference is not simply that one is cautious and the other is aggressive. It is that one assumes that war must be anchored in a plan, while the other one assumes political advantage can be extracted through improvisation. Under Powell, the central question was whether the US knew what it was doing before it went to war. Under Trump, the logic seems to be that American military power makes clear objectives unnecessary. The aims can be worked out afterwards, turning war into another instrument of Trump’s campaign machine: a spectacle in which victory can always be declared because the purpose is defined only after the fact.
“What is emerging under Trump is something more unstable: a way of war in which objectives are deliberately left open, success is endlessly redefined, and improvisation itself becomes a source of political advantage.”
The Powell Doctrine should not be romanticised. Long before Trump, the United States launched wars on more than dubious grounds, with devastating human consequences and little regard for international law. But even those wars were still framed around the idea that military force had to serve a defined objective. What is emerging under Trump is something more unstable: a way of war in which objectives are deliberately left open, success is endlessly redefined, and improvisation itself becomes a source of political advantage.
That is what makes this war in Iran so significant. Its chaos is not merely the consequence of poor planning; it is part of the logic of the campaign itself. A war without fixed aims is easier to escalate, easier to sell, and easier to declare victorious at any chosen moment. The cost, however, is borne elsewhere: by ordinary Iranians trapped under bombardment and blackout, by a region pushed deeper into instability, and by an international order further hollowed out by a superpower that now appears willing to make war first and decide later what it was for.
Aiden Bijloo has an academic background in international humanitarian action and has worked with humanitarian organisations in Thailand as well as at NATO. With family roots in Iran, he has a long-standing interest in developments in the country. He currently works at the Netherlands Enterprise and Development Agency as a Programme Advisor for Humanitarian Affairs and is active with the Dutch National Youth Council (NJR), contributing to the representation of youth voices in governmental policy.